Wednesday, March 30, 2011

Why Assad Didn't Learn His Lesson

Syrian President Bashar Assad's speech this morning raises an important puzzle. In academy-speak: What accounts for variation in regime learning in response to popular protests calling for its ouster?

But in policy-speak: why didn't Bashar Assad get the message that giving a big staged speech with no actual reforms or concessions just aggravates people and raises antagonism against the regime? Both Ben Ali in Tunisia and Mubarak in Egypt suffered for their speeches which were widely out of touch with the tone of public discourse in their own countries.

The answer may be the result of two factors.

First, the more oppressive the state, the greater the separation between government and people. This puts policy elites and heads of state out of touch with the tone of public opinion.

Second, elites in dictatorships spend considerable time trying to ensure the prevalence of the regime over time. Over time, this constant struggle may lead to paranoia about instability which impairs the ability of these elites to accept that a) reforms are necessary and b) they can create regime prevalence. It is unclear whether Assad honestly thinks the protests are an Israeli conspiracy, but these conspiracy theories have been present in the speeches of Mubarak, Ben Ali, and Gaddafi as well. It may very well be that these dictators became the victims of their own propaganda.

Monday, March 28, 2011

A Punch in the Face to Israeli Security

The passage of the Israeli citizenship bill earlier today is a threat to the national security of the State of Israel.

The passage of the bill exacerbates tensions between Jews and Arabs, setting the conditions for polarization and radicalization which threaten Israeli citizens. It will likely be used for propaganda value, successfully, by Islamist terrorist organizations who seek Israel's destruction. It damages ties between the Israeli national police (Shin Bet) and Arab citizens of Israel. For this reason, the Shin Bet has opposed the bill. These unnecessary tensions endanger the lives and well-being of Israelis, and present serious long-term concerns about their safety.

The Citizenship Bill delegitimizes Israel, its democratic foundations, and its relationship with the West. Every basic notion of public relations is violated by this punch in the face to Israeli security. This bill will be a tough sell for American pro-Israel organizations across the political spectrum. It will not be their fault, nor the fault of the international community, for failing to understand as democratic a bill which strips citizens of their rights and creates a perception of systematic oppression of the Israeli Arab minority. The passage of this bill represents a complete and total hasbara failure, and a severe threat to the way Israel is perceived in the international community. Given the rising tension on the Gaza border, this threat has immediate implications for the safety of Israelis.

The citizenship bill is a dangerous provocation and a serious security liability to the State of Israel. Legitimate attempts to repeal or annul it are consistent with the preservation of the security of the Israeli state.

3rd Intifada Facebook Page Translated

The following is an Arabic-to-English translation of a Facebook page calling for a 3rd Palestinian intifada. The page has over 340,000 "likes" and has drawn considerable press attention. Facebook also has drawn attention from the ADL over the page, which it refuses to remove. Here is the full translation of the page:


The Third Palestinian Intifada
Palestine will be liberated
and we will liberate it.

Top (Yellow box):

Alert -
Countries neighboring Palestine will begin to march to Palestine on May 15, after the marches of neighboring states, soon after all Islamic countries will begin to march. Our time is close. Palestine will be liberated and we will liberate it. Our goal now is to reach millions of subscribers to this page before May. Arise, please publish the page in every place. Onward, Palestine.

Copy our link and put it in your profile, and publish it in every picture and video and pages and everywhere.

Black boxes: we are limited in our rights...forgive us, and we forgive your sons for that...We are longing and will engage in perseverance, resistance, and struggle for we have done and will continue to do forever.
We adore you, oh motherland.

After the Tunisian intifada, the Egyptian intifada, and the Libyan intifada
The time has come for the Palestinian intifada

Below the black boxes:

The first Palestinian intifada was in the year 1987
The second Palestinian intifada was in the year 2000
And the third Palestinian intifada:


Black box with fists on either side:
This page was created on 3/6/11
And Allah willing we will reach 1 million followers this week
The time has come for the liberation of Palestine

Anyone who has a profile on Facebook, we request that you publish this page
Palestine will be free and we will free it
Forward, Palestine

Red oval:

If Facebook blocks this page, all Muslims will boycott Facebook forever!

Sunday, March 27, 2011

Why Iron Dome Isn't a Panacea

@SuttonGL's Twitter comment to myself and @NoahPollack on the Iron Dome missile system being deployed in Israel is an interesting one. Given that he was kind enough to view my Twitter feed, here's an explanation that's not just a snarky tweet:

The intent of my RT (I can't speak for Noah Pollack's intentions) was to look at the long-term viability of using an anti-missile system to underwrite security in Israel's south. In its current strategic use, Iron Dome is an unsustainable security option for Israel.

In 2010, 315 rockets and mortars were fired at Israel. If Iron Dome were deployed against these attacks, it would have cost Israel between 11 million and 15.8 million dollars (the actual price of a Tamir intercept missile is actually somewhere between $35,000 and $50,000). In wartime, the number of projectiles, and the ensuing cost to Israel, would have been significantly higher.

As one metric of the total cost of Iron Dome, the Obama administration granted Israel 205 million dollars in funding for Iron Dome's development, and that was mostly for just the control centers. The total cost over a 5-10 year period of the entire Iron Dome system (missiles, batteries, troop deployments, control centers, and radar), without change in the Israel-Gaza situation, would be enormous.

Conversely, Hamas' cost of continued rocket attacks would be low. It is using significantly cheaper Qassam, Katyusha, and Grad rockets, as well as mortars. It also has significant rearming capabilities including shipments, and smuggling through tunnels from the Sinai, which Israel ultimately did not deny Hamas even during Operation Cast Lead.

While Iron Dome is capable of engaging multiple targets (exactly how many appears not to be in the open source), Hamas may react by trying to overwhelm the system. It likely has more rockets that Iron Dome can engage at once. Hamas could also try to target the Tamir batteries themselves, denying Israel Iron Dome's capabilities altogether. Most importantly, Hamas could just fire missiles with the intent of draining Israel's defense budget. Given the price differentials, Israel would run low on money for Iron Dome far before Hamas would run low on rockets.

The point is that Iron Dome may protect Israelis most of the time, but it will not stop or deter Hamas over the long term. Ultimately, Iron Dome is a defensive system. It can protect Israeli citizens but it cannot create long-term stability on the Israel-Gaza border. Iron Dome is a good system but it will not win a war against Hamas, nor will it create long-term security for Israel. The reduction in violence in Iraq was not the result of body armor or MRAPs, but rather the result of the political order created in the wake of the Surge. Clearly body armor and MRAPs played a role in the success of the Surge, but they were sub-components of a larger, effective strategy. For Iron Dome to be sustainable both economically and strategically in the long-term, it needs to be treated as an emergency relief system, not as an insurance policy for the security of Southern Israel.

Saturday, March 26, 2011

In Defense of Ben-Gurion University

On Friday, the University of Johannesburg cut its formal 25-year relationship with Ben Gurion University of the Negev (BGU) in Beer Sheva, Israel. The news has particular significance given South Africa's apartheid history.

However, the news also warrants serious concern.

Firstly, the boycott harms anti-occupation efforts rather than helping them. It's simply non-sensical to boycott BGU in order to promote ending occupation because some of Israel's most radically liberal and vocal occupation critics are professors at BGU. Dr. Oren Yiftahel's book Ethnocracy defined the academic discourse over racial discrimination in Israel. Dr. Neve Gordon published an LA Times editorial asking Americans to boycott his own country. His right to do so was upheld by the president of the University, Dr. Rivka Carmi. Dr. David Newman is a well-known columnist for the Jerusalem Post where he consistently is critical of Israeli government policies. Boycotting BGU means boycotting the institution which financially supports some of the most anti-occupation activists in Israel, if not the world.

Secondly, academic boycotts violate the doctrine of academic freedom. Those professors who are tenured at the University of Johannesburg base their economic well-being on a commitment to the freedom of ideas. To cause intentional harm to a similar arena of discourse compromises this freedom. The academy creates progress by advancing good ideas and demonstrating the flaws of bad ideas, not by censoring them. As a Ph.D student myself, I have seen firsthand how this process is at the heart of the academy's ability to function and progress.

Finally, the boycott distracts from the real issues in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The boycott is Nyquil Diplomacy, helping UJ supporters of divestment sleep better. But I defy anyone to explain how it helps children under rocket attack in Sderot, or mortar fire in Gaza for no fault of their own. Had the UJ resolution supporters each given a single South African rand instead, it could have been used to buy medical equipment, or food, or to promote collaboration between rights activists in the two countries, or to fund BGU-Bir-Zeit collaboration. Ineffective boycotts are an annoyance, but slacktivist resolutions in the face of the humanitarian emergency that is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are reprehensible. Given a chance to make a real difference on the ground, the UJ supporters of boycott chose to further isolate a country which already has a siege mentality, cut off those who support Palestinian rights, and damage the legitimacy of the academy in the process.

As a former student at BGU (full disclosure), I have seen firsthand the positive role it plays in the political life of the State of Israel. The range of thoughtful and intellectual people I encountered during my studies was as wide as at any South African, European, or American university. Discussion of human rights, discrimination, and security policy was not censored but encouraged in my classes. For any university to sever ties over BGU's supposed lack of academic legitimacy is not only beyond ironic, but an unfortunate misunderstanding of the realities on the ground in Israel.

Wednesday, March 23, 2011

On Human Life

We owe it to the victims of today's attack in Jerusalem, and those civilians who have been injured or killed in Gaza, to exercise caution in our dealings with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Today's attacks drive home that too many people have been hurt or killed to boil down the tragedy of the conflict to political mudslinging. When politics has the potential to be a solution, it is reprehensible to use it to entrench or turn a blind eye to the problem.

The deaths of innocent civilians must never be taken lightly. The way forward is unclear, but we should have no misgivings that protecting the lives of those who are in danger can be a common point of agreement. It is pro-Israel, pro-Palestinian, and pro-American to pursue the protection of innocent civilians as a security policy in the Middle East.

Tuesday, March 22, 2011

Turkey Looks West

Turkey has slowly been aligning itself with Western interests over the past month. A consideration of Turkey-West relations since the beginning of March reveals a several Turkish actions which align squarely with Western interests. In particular, Israel has reciprocated these overtures:

March 20 - Announcement that Turkey will represent US interests in Libya.

There are three caveats to this trend. First, Turkey is hesitant to support NATO control over the Libyan no-fly zone. Second, Turkey is adamant that Israel apologize specifically for wrongdoing in the Gaza flotilla incident. Thirdly, the Turkish non-profit, government-linked IHH will send a new round of ships to challenge Israel's Gaza blockade.

While Turkey has some reservation about Western actions, it is also taking steps not to alienate entirely the West. There may be some cases of clear policy differences, but these are not tantamount to fundamentally irreconcilable positions by any means. Turkey is continuing to implement its "Zero Problems" strategy by positioning itself as a mediator between the US, Israel, Europe, and the Arab World. Moving forward, it will be critical for Western policy makers to understand the nuance of this position and to engage with it in a way which resonates with their own national interests.

Monday, March 21, 2011

The Policy Discrepancies on Libya

White House and Department of Defense statements from the past 48 hours suggest different levels of interest in ousting Col. Muamar Gaddafi:

March 20

- "We still believe that Qaddafi has lost his legitimacy to lead and must go." - White House Spokesman Tommy Vietor (published March 20).

- "Certainly the goals of this campaign right now are limited, and it isn't, it isn't about seeing him [Gaddafi] go. It's about supporting the United Nations resolution..." - CJCS Adm. Michael Mullen


- "It is US policy that Gaddafi has to go." - President Obama

- "No, I don't worry too much about mission creep. The military mission here is pretty clear -- it is very clear, frankly, and what is expected of us to do: to establish this no-fly zone; to protect civilians; to cause the -- you know, to get the withdrawal of regime ground forces out of Benghazi." - AFRICOM Commander Gen. Carter Ham

- "We expected in a matter of days to be able to turn over the primary responsibility to others." - SECDEF Gates

While White House statements have been unequivocal and direct, DoD statements are much more nuanced, discussing Gaddafi's ouster as one possible outcome and preferring to discuss enforcement of the no-fly zone itself. Given that President Obama was in South America and Secretary Clinton in Paris, the message of nuance was easy for DoD principals to get out over the airwaves Sunday morning here in the States. Admiral Mullen spoke on Meet The Press and Secretary Gates made comments to reporters en route to Russia. Clearly there is no direct contradiction between DoD and the White House. However, different interests are compelling different levels of support for ousting Gaddafi.

The White House's primary interests are to demonstrate credibility internationally, to demonstrate cooperation with the international community, and to bolster support from the American public, about half of whom approve of the President's handling of the situation. Intervention in Libya is also intended to send a clear signal that those Arab leaders who engage in violence will lose support from the US. At the same time, ousting Gaddafi might regain the momentum of Tunisia and Egypt which Gaddafi has disrupted. Finally, a strong moral impetus weighs on the administration after US non-intervention in Rwanda, as others have pointed out.

In contrast, the DoD's primary interest is to limit its engagement in Libya and focus on Iraq and Afghanistan. The DoD expressed anxiety about a no-fly zone earlier this month for the vast amount of resources it would require. Now it is being asked to plan the endstate for a situation in which it has reasonable doubts that an optimal endstate is possible. In response, its public affairs message is focused on the immediate goals of enforcing a no-fly zone and transferring responsibility to the international community.

Notably absent from the debate has been the State Department. Given the general alignment of State and the White House on this issue, there is little need for State to comment (although Secretary Clinton did hint that Gaddafi should leave last Thursday in comments on a Tunisian television program). Certainly it would be in American diplomatic interests to have a democratically elected leader of Libya rather than Gaddafi, with whom the US will never be able to hold a meaningful relationship.

As the air campaign continues, the key challenge for President Obama will be to find the balance between an endstate in Libya which demonstrates US policy consistency, and one which is pragmatically feasible. While some in government may fret about mismatching statements, the cost is a small one for the benefit of having a government where competing interests and consideration of all perspectives informs policy.

Saturday, March 19, 2011

The US Military's Dual Role on Libya

At 3pm EDT, Saturday, March 19, 2011, the United States launched 112 Tomahawk Cruise Missiles at more than 20 targets on the coast of Libya. The strikes are the first wave of a multinational effort to secure a no-fly zone in Libya and enforce UNSCR 1973. The United States is currently in the lead, given its unique capabilities as a military power, but will switch to a support role in the coming days. The US' immediate tactics in the so-called Operation Odyssey Dawn are threefold:

1) Target the Libyan air defense system
2) Jam communications among Gaddafi's forces
3) Establish Command and Control for the operations

In the coming days, the US military will need to play the dual role of executing the orders of the Commander-in-Chief and simultaneously shaping the end goal towards which those orders are aimed. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Commander of CENTCOM Gen. James Mattis have both expressed concern about the resources needed to enforce such a complex operation. However, given the imperative to design an endstate, the pragmatic approach of the DoD is a strong asset to the policy debate on Libya, even if it has raised pulses at the Pentagon.

Scattered reports suggest that none of the endstates under consideration by the DoD leave Gaddafi in power. This makes sense given the bridge the US has crossed by using military force in a Muslim country. Yet what exactly will occur remains unclear. Future operational plans are classified with good reason, and any endstate would require the assent of the US, Britain, and France at least. Additionally, the success of the campaign will require little to no civilian casualties in Libya as a result of coalition airstrikes. Libyan State TV has already accused the "Crusader enemy" of creating civilian casualties, a report yet to be confirmed.

One possible outcome would be that the intensity of the military campaign forces Gaddafi to divert his remaining military resources from recapturing Benghazi. Military action also could create the diplomatic leverage from the international community to compel Gaddafi's ouster. Conceivably this would look like Mubarak's flight to Sharm el-Sheikh, seeing as how Gaddafi has sworn to die on Libyan soil. But Gaddafi's sons will also have to be kept out of the political arena, and the resistance will need help building the capacity to run the country in a liberal democratic way. Without the help of an army or a bureaucratic corps like in Tunisia and Egypt, the situation could very easily turn into a nation-building mission. On the 8th anniversary of the start of Coalition operations in Iraq, this possibility raises eyebrows in Washington.

While the bad news is that the intended outcome of these strikes remains uncertain, the good news is that they are being led by a military which understands this situation to be the state of play. As the implementation of a no-fly zone moves forward and the thinking of the international community shifts towards the endgame, the US military will have an important leadership role to play in focusing the doctrinal objectives of the international community into strategically and tactically achievable changes to the status-quo in Libya.

Thursday, March 17, 2011

No-Fly Zone Approved for Libya

The UN Security Council authorized a no-fly zone over Libya around 6:30 this evening in a 10-0-5 vote. The US voted in favor, China and Russia both abstained.

Reaction here in Washington is anxious. Most of the concern focuses on end states (see yesterday's post). Analysts are extremely worried about getting drawn into a protracted conflict, and consider any military action in Libya to essentially be an act of war. Concern is also high surrounding President Obama's departure to Latin America while military action to enforce a no-fly zone is ongoing.

The silver lining is that Gaddafi seems to have not expected the resolution to pass, and that Libyans seem pretty happy about it, with some reservations it might disempower the rebels to invite in the international community. The best case would be for the resolution, without military action, to shift the calculus in Libya enough to move the crisis towards stasis.

If it does come down to military action (which would occur, according to Laura Rozen, in the next 24-48 hours), the entire international community will be involved in the effort, rather than just the US.

Ultimately, it seems that the decision to pass the resolution was the right choice. But there are many difficult choices ahead, and many people who will need to coordinate to make them a reality.

UNSC Vote on Libya

The UN Security Council is scheduled to vote in the next 30 minutes on a no-fly zone in Libya. With Gaddafi's troops ready to strike Benghazi, British and French forces with support from the US and two Arab states are preparing to enforce the no-fly zone. There is a good chance of an airstrike in Libya in the next 12 hours.

Here is the text of the resolution, from those of you who didn't catch it in Colum Lynch's post on Foreign Policy earlier today:


The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 1970 (2011) of 26 February 2011,

Deploring the failure of the Libyan authorities to comply with resolution 1970 (2011),

Expressing grave concern at the deteriorating situation, the escalation of violence, and the heavy civilian casualties,

Reiterating the responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population and reaffirming that parties to armed conflicts bear the primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of civilians,

Condemning the gross and systematic violation of human rights, including arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, torture and summary executions,

Further condemning acts of violence and intimidation committed by the Libyan authorities against journalists, media professionals and associated personnel and urging these authorities to comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law as outlined in resolution 1738 (2006),

Considering that the widespread and systematic attacks currently taking place in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya against the civilian population may amount to crimes against humanity,

Recalling paragraph 26 of resolution 1970 (2011) in which the Council expressed its readiness to consider taking additional appropriate measures, as necessary, to facilitate and support the return of humanitarian agencies and make available humanitarian and related assistance in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Expressing its determination to ensure the protection of civilians and civilian populated areas and the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance and the safety of humanitarian personnel,

Recalling the condemnation by the League of Arab States, the African Union, and the Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference of the serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law that have been and are being committed in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Taking note of the final communiqué of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference of 8 March 2011 and the communiqué of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union of 10 March 2011 which established an ad hoc High Level Committee on Libya,

Taking note also of the decision of the Council of the League of Arab States of 12 March 2011 to call for the imposition of a no-fly zone on Libyan military aviation, and to establish safe areas in places exposed to shelling as a precautionary measurethat allows the protection of the Libyan people and foreign nationals residing in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Taking note further of the Secretary-General’s call on 16 March 2011 for an immediate cease-fire,

Recalling its decision to refer the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya since 15 February 2011 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, and stressing that those responsible for or complicit in attacks targeting the civilian population, including aerial and naval attacks, must be held to account,

Reiterating its concern at the plight of refugees and foreign workers forced to flee the violence in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, welcoming the response of neighbouring States, in particular Tunisia and Egypt, to address the needs of those refugees and foreign workers, and calling on the international community to support those efforts,

Deploring the continuing use of mercenaries by the Libyan authorities,

Considering that the establishment of a ban of all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya constitutes an important element for the protection of civilians as well as the safety of the delivery of humanitarian assistance and a decisive step for the cessation of hostilities in Libya,

Expressing concern also for the safety of foreign nationals and their rights in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Welcoming the appointment by the Secretary General of his Special Envoy to Libya, Mr Abdel-Elah Mohamed Al-Khatib and supporting his efforts to find a sustainable and peaceful solution to the crisis in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,

Determining that the situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 1. Demands the immediate establishment of a cease-fire and a complete

end to violence and all attacks against, and abuses of, civilians;

2. Stresses the need to intensify efforts to find a solution to the crisis which responds to the legitimate demands of the Libyan people and notes the decisions of the Secretary-General to send his Special Envoy to Libya and of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union to send its ad hoc High Level Committee to Libya with the aim of facilitating dialogue to lead to the political reforms necessary to find a peaceful and sustainable solution;

3. Demands that the Libyan authorities comply with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law, human rights and refugee

law and take all measures to protect civilians and meet their basic needs, and to ensure the rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian assistance;

Protection of civilians

4. Authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, to take all necessary measures, notwithstanding paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011), to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory, and requests the Member States concerned to inform the Secretary-General immediately of the measures they take pursuant to the authorization conferred by this paragraph which shall be immediately reported to the Security Council;

5. Recognizes the important role of the League of Arab States in matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security in the region and bearing in mind Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, requests the Member States of the League of Arab States to cooperate with other Member States in the implementation of paragraph 4;

No Fly Zone

6. Decides to establish a ban on all flights in the airspace of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in order to help protect civilians;

7. Decides further that the ban imposed by paragraph 6 shall not apply to flights whose sole purpose is humanitarian, such as delivering or facilitating the delivery of assistance, including medical supplies, food, humanitarian workers and related assistance, or evacuating foreign nationals from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, nor shall it apply to flights authorised by paragraphs 4 or 8, nor other flights which are deemed necessary by States acting under the authorisation conferred in paragraph 8 to be for the benefit of the Libyan people, and that these flights shall be coordinated with any mechanism established in paragraph 8;

8. Authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to take all necessary measures to enforce compliance with the ban on flights imposed by paragraph 6 above, and requests the States concerned in cooperation with the League of Arab States to coordinate closely with the Secretary General on the measures they are taking to implement this ban, including by establishing an appropriate mechanism for implementing the provisions of paragraphs 6 and 7 above,

9. Calls upon all Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to provide assistance, including any necessary over- flight approvals, for the purposes of implementing paragraphs 4, 6, 7 and 8 above;

10. Requests the Member States concerned to coordinate closely with each other and the Secretary-General on the measures they are taking to implement paragraphs 4, 6, 7 and 8 above, including practical measures for the monitoring and approval of authorised humanitarian or evacuation flights;

11. Decides that the Member States concerned shall inform the Secretary- General and the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States immediately of measures taken in exercise of the authority conferred by paragraph 8 above, including to supply a concept of operations;

12. Requests the Secretary-General to inform the Council immediately of any actions taken by the Member States concerned in exercise of the authority conferred by paragraph 8 above and to report to the Council within 7 days and every month thereafter on the implementation of this resolution, including information on any violations of the flight ban imposed by paragraph 6 above ;

Enforcement of the arms embargo

13. Decides that paragraph 11 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall be replaced by the following paragraph : “Calls upon all Member States, in particular States of the region, acting nationally or through regional organisations or arrangements, in order to ensure strict implementation of the arms embargo established by paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 1970 (2011), to inspect in their territory, including seaports and airports, and on the high seas, vessels and aircraft bound to or from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, if the State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo contains items the supply, sale, transfer or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 9 or 10 of resolution 1970 (2011) as modified by this resolution, including the supply of armed mercenary personnel, calls upon all flag States of such vessels and aircraft to cooperate with such inspections and authorises Member States to use all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances to carry out such inspections”;

14. Requests Member States which are taking action under paragraph 13 above on the high seas to coordinate closely with each other and the Secretary- General and further requests the States concerned to inform the Secretary-General and the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 24 of resolution 1970 (2011) (“the Committee”) immediately of measures taken in the exercise of the authority conferred by paragraph 13 above;

15. Requires any Member State whether acting nationally or through regional organisations or arrangements, when it undertakes an inspection pursuant to paragraph 13 above, to submit promptly an initial written report to the Committee containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds for the inspection, the results of such inspection, and whether or not cooperation was provided, and, if prohibited items for transfer are found, further requires such Member States to submit to the Committee, at a later stage, a subsequent written report containing relevant details on the inspection, seizure, and disposal, and relevant details of the transfer, including a description of the items, their origin and intended destination, if this information is not in the initial report;

16. Deplores the continuing flows of mercenaries into the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and calls upon all Member States to comply strictly with their obligations

under paragraph 9 of resolution 1970 (2011) to prevent the supply of armed mercenary personnel to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya;

Ban on flights

17. Decides that all States shall deny permission to any aircraft registered in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya or owned or operated by Libyan nationals or companies to take off from, land in or overfly their territory unless the particular flight has been approved in advance by the Committee, or in the case of an emergency landing;

18. Decides that all States shall deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly their territory, if they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft contains items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraphs 9 and 10 of resolution 1970 (2011) as modified by this resolution, including the provision of armed mercenary personnel, except in the case of an emergency landing;

Asset freeze

19. Decides that the asset freeze imposed by paragraph 17, 19, 20 and 21 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall apply to all funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories, which are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the Libyan authorities, as designated by the Committee, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, as designated by the Committee, and decides further that all States shall ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any individuals or entities within their territories, to or for the benefit of the Libyan authorities, as designated by the Committee, or individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or entities owned or controlled by them, as designated by the Committee, and directs the Committee to designate such Libyan authorities, individuals or entities within 30 days of the date of the adoption of this resolution and as appropriate thereafter;

20. Affirms its determination to ensure that assets frozen pursuant to paragraph 17 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall, at a later stage, as soon as possible be made available to and for the benefit of the people of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya;

21. Decides that all States shall require their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and firms incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction to exercise vigilance when doing business with entities incorporated in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya or subject to its jurisdiction, and any individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and entities owned or controlled by them, if the States have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that such business could contribute to violence and use of force against civilians;


22. Decides that the individuals listed in Annex I shall be subject to the travel restrictions imposed in paragraphs 15 and 16 of resolution 1970 (2011), and decides

further that the individuals and entities listed in Annex II shall be subject to the asset freeze imposed in paragraphs 17, 19, 20 and 21 of resolution 1970 (2011);

23. Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 15 and 17 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall apply also to individuals and entities determined by the Council or the Committee to have violated the provisions of resolution 1970 (2011), particularly paragraphs 9 and 10 thereof, or to have assisted others in doing so;

Panel of Experts

24. Requests the Secretary-General to create for an initial period of one year, in consultation with the Committee, a group of up to eight experts (“Panel of Experts”), under the direction of the Committee to carry out the following tasks:

(a) assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate as specified in paragraph 24 of resolution 1970 (2011) and this resolution;

(b) gather, examine and analyse information from States, relevant United Nations bodies, regional organisations and other interested parties regarding the implementation of the measures decided in resolution 1970 (2011) and this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance;

(c) make recommendations on actions the Council, or the Committee or State, may consider to improve implementation of the relevant measures;

(d) provide to the Council an interim report on its work no later than [90 days] after the Panel’s appointment, and a final report to the Council no later than [30 days] prior to the termination of its mandate with its findings and recommendations;

25. Urges all States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties, to cooperate fully with the Committee and the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementation of the measures decided in resolution 1970 (2011) and this resolution, in particular incidents of non- compliance;

26. Decides that the mandate of the Committee as set out in paragraph 24 of resolution 1970 (2011) shall also apply to the measures decided in this resolution;

27. Decides that all States, including the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, shall take the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Libyan authorities, or of any person or body in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, or of any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or body, in connection with any contract or other transaction where its performance was affected by reason of the measures taken by the Security Council in resolution 1970 (2011), this resolution and related resolutions;

28. Reaffirms its intention to keep the actions of the Libyan authorities under continuous review and underlines its readiness to review at any time the measures imposed by this resolution and resolution 1970 (2011), including by strengthening, suspending or lifting those measures, as appropriate, based on compliance by the Libyan authorities with this resolution and resolution 1970 (2011).

29. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.